This eventful story was an important part of the process that decided the fate of the East-Central European region. The immediate cause of political contention between Belgrade and Moscow was their differences over the Hungarian question, especially the fate of Imre Nagy, who had been prime minister during the revolution. The intrinsic conflicts lay deeper, however. Although the Nagy affair remained an important factor in the disagreements throughout -from his kidnapping to the 'war of the protest notes' that followed his execution -it acted mainly as a catalyst. The Nagy affair was an insurmountable problem for all the players concerned. It provided ample fuel for the debates, and each side found that it could be used to put pressure on the other. Due to the system of relations between the three communist countries, the Hungarian side played the least active part. János Kádár, having come to power through the crushing of the uprising of October 1956, was left in no doubt that Hungary had to follow faithfully the Kremlin's foreign-policy line and accommodate itself to Soviet regional policy requirements.
reconciliation process reached the stage where high-level relations could be restored, the hard-line Rákosi group regained power in Budapest, with Kremlin support.
This soon began to impede Moscow's efforts with Yugoslavia, which were aimed at restoring what it perceived as the normal order in the region seen as the Soviet sphere of influence.
Even after Stalin's death, the Soviet Union continued to perceive the communist-ruled countries in terms of regional power politics, and to treat the socialist camp as a tight, centrally controlled, bloc. Yugoslavia, with its policy of a separate road, was an irritant. It was a foreign body in the system. It stood as a living disproof of the ideological tenet that world socialism, having reached the stage of implementation, could only exist and triumph as a world system by remaining a single bloc based on identical principles. Khrushchev, the exponent of reconciliation, saw
Tito's separate road as the harmful outcome of Stalin's erroneous policy, but thought clever policy-making might repair the damage his predecessor had done.
Khrushchev did not find it easy to hit the right note with the Yugoslav communists, who were fearful for their national interests and their ideology. The trouble was not confined to the conflict of interests in regional policy. The ideological and conceptual problems were tied up with the power question. Either side risked a great deal by making ideological concessions, because there were also blunt considerations of power behind the way in which the basic principles seen as binding on the whole communist world were interpreted. So the reconciliation process was constantly subject to a tactical search for ideological, diplomatic and economic equilibrium.
The first major step in the process of Soviet-Yugoslav reconciliation was a pilgrimage of penance to Belgrade, made by Khrushchev and Bulganin in May 1955. This ended the open antagonism and improved the situation for Yugoslavia. 6 It was vital for Yugoslavia to settle relations with the Soviet Union because it faced grave economic problems, despite Western assistance, and it was surrounded by hostile countries. However, Yugoslavia did not wish to trade concessions in its international position for normalization. It was intent on retaining its independence and its good relations with the West. The Soviet Union was called upon to recognize Yugoslavia's independence and international freedom of movement, and its sovereign right to its own internal system. The two sides put far from identical constructions on what was achieved at the Belgrade meeting, which already signalled a difference of underlying approach. For the Belgrade declaration, see Stephen Clissold, ed., Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union, 1939 -1973 . A Documentary Survey (London, New York and Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1975 , 254-7. 7 Tito reiterated his position in a letter of 29 Jun. 1955 , to the CPSU central committee. This was a response to a letter from Khrushchev, to the communist parties of the socialist countries, on 25 June. He represented the meeting as something that had brought Yugoslavia closer to the Soviet fold and distanced it from the West. Both letters can be found in the Magyar Országos Levéltar (Hungarian National Archives, hereafter MOL) 276. f. 65/117.
Union (CPSU), in February 1956
. A few months later, the joint declaration agreed at a Moscow summit meeting between Tito and Khrushchev in June was justifiably marked as a success by the Belgrade leadership. They made no concessions regarding their independence or principles, which greatly enhanced Yugoslavia's reputation. 8 The success also gave support to Tito's exaggerated foreign-policy ambitions, for apart from aspiring to lead the infant movement of non-aligned countries, he aimed to raise his country's regional standing by influencing the de-Stalinization process in Eastern Europe. There the Yugoslav president needed allies, or at least partners, against the compromised Stalinist leaders in the socialist countries. Yugoslavia, on its separate road, was not just a thorn in their side because of its internal policies. It was a personal threat to them, since it was making changes that called their earlier policies into question. Tito naturally saw Khrushchev as his main partner, but he tended to overestimate the Soviet leader's commitment to reform. The strident demand for changes in Poland and Hungary and the struggles between reformers and the orthodox camp led the Yugoslav leaders to hope that their concept of socialism could be vindicated and Yugoslavian regional foreign policy ambitions realized.
The Moscow declaration did not end the tensions caused by the two sides' conflicting aims. Khrushchev reverted to a pendulum policy. On the one hand he sought to reassure the Stalinist leaders of the countries under his influence that there had been no changes of principle. For the sake of regional stability, he tried to curb the efforts at reform, especially the demands for increased national independence.
On the other hand he encouraged neighbouring countries, especially Hungary, to pursue further rapprochement with Yugoslavia.
One important factor behind Rákosi's dismissal was that Tito refused to raise the process of Hungarian-Yugoslav reconciliation to the top political level while leaders compromised by the anti-Yugoslav policy remained in power. 9 However, Belgrade put no trust either in Rákosi's successor as first secretary, Ernő Gerő, as he was the most influential member of the Rákosi group. It took a series of gestures, including the rehabilitation and reburial of László Rajk and his associates, coupled with persuasion by the Soviet leaders, before agreement was reached for a Hungarian party and government delegation to visit Yugoslavia on 15-22 October 1956. 10 It was clear that the Yugoslavs only accepted the Gerő leadership out of necessity, 8 See Clissold, Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. ' Rákosi, first secretary of the Hungarian Workers' Party, was dismissed at a meeting of the central leadership on 18 Jul. 1956. Later he was taken to Moscow, from where he never returned.
The first move came in a letter from Gerő to Tito on 19 Jul. 1956 {Documents I, item 19).
On 5 Oct., while Tito and Rankovic were staying in the Crimea, Khrushchev arranged without their knowledge for a meeting with Gerő. It was there that agreement was reached over the reburial of Rajk and his executed associates, and on the visit to Yugoslavia by a top-level Hungarian delegation.
The reburial of Rajk on 6 Oct. 1956 , assumed the character of a mass demonstration. Y. V. Andropov, the Soviet ambassador in Budapest, in a report on 12 Oct. of his discussion with Gerő, already referred to a worsening Hungarian domestic political situation and mounting Yugoslav influence. See Vjacseszlav Szereda and Alekszandr Sztikalin, eds., Hiányzó lapok 1956 történetéből. Dokumentok a volt SZKP KB levéltárából (Missing Pages from the History of 1956. Documents from the Archives of the former CPSU CC), (Budapest: Móra, 1993), 83-90. and did not expect any serious reforms from them. On the other hand there was a discernible common interest, based on agreement in principle, between Tito and the opposition reform group round Imre Nagy. Nagy's foreign-policy views and intentions were in line with the independent Yugoslav policy, based on equal rights and the principle of non-intervention.
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These aroused hopes in Belgrade that if events were favourable, Nagy might prove a direct ally in Yugoslavia's northern neighbour, and a partner in the de-Stalinization process in line with Yugoslav ideas.
After all, their common goal was a communist, if not a 'Muscovite', solution to the crisis. To Hungary's reformers, the Yugoslav example (along with the efforts in Poland) was the main encouragement and stimulus to move towards independence and democratization.
One idea that appeared prominently in US foreign policy at this time was that 'national communism' of the Yugoslav type might be a first step towards weakening the Soviet camp and communism.
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However, this was only identified later with Yugoslav intentions, by those fabricating a conspiracy theory to justify the reprisals in Hungary. More important to the loose relationship that arose between Yugoslav diplomats accredited to Budapest and some members of Nagy's opposition group were shared political intentions. These provided a firm basis for the widespread sympathy for Yugoslavia found in Hungarian society.
II. Yugoslavia and the Hungarian revolution
The outbreak of the armed uprising in Budapest on 23 October and the force behind it caught the Yugoslav leaders by surprise, although they had sensed that the crisis was deepening. The Yugoslav stance was ambivalent from the outset. They saw in the uprising proof that the Stalinist leadership of Rakosi and Gero was bankrupt, 13 and that radical changes were needed in the practice of socialism. They hoped for a Yugoslav-style change, but they certainly did not want to see an upheaval that wrested control over events from the communist leadership.
The positive example in Belgrade's eyes was Poland and the type of solution to a crisis that had brought Wladislaw Gomulka to power. However, a Polish type of consolidation ceased to be feasible once the Hungarian and Soviet leaden had branded the uprising as counter-revolutionary from the outset and decided to deploy Soviet troops to end it by force. 14 After all, it had rested primarily on Gomulka, as a communist leader, following a policy that aroused national feelings, in spite of the Soviet Union. Also important was the fact that the workers' uprising " See Imre Nagy: Imre Nagy on Communism: In Defense of the New Course (New York: Praeger,
1957)-
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For Resolution 5608 of the National Security Council, on United States policy towards the satellite countries, see Foreign Relations of the United States 1955 As late as 22 Oct., the Yugoslavs signed a joint declaration with Gero, but after the uprising, this assistance in legitimizing the old leadership was treated as if it had never happened. 14 Gomulka himself put the example of the Polish consolidation before the Hungarian leaders. But its real significance came only after the second Soviet intervention on 4 November, when it served more as self-justification than a real pattern for the Hungarians. This ambivalent assessment meant that the first official Yugoslav reactions were restrained. The gratification at the collapse of the Stalinist leadership did not go to extremes. Although the Soviet intervention was faulted, the Yugoslavs avoided condemning it outright by blaming the events that had precipitated it. At the same time they expressed sympathy with the policy of satisfying rightful popular demands, which they expected the new communist leaders to pursue. Belgrade saw 28 October as the watershed, when the party central committee had recognized the events as a national democratic uprising and met some popular demands, but had maintained the bases of the economic and political system. That was a platform on which an independent, but still patently communist, system could rest. On 29 October Tito complied with a request to support the Hungarian party leadership's efforts in an open letter, but also set limits to what the antiStalinist and national communist platform should attempt. 16 The position taken by the Yugoslav communists encompassed the anxiety that imbued Tito's letter, with its warning of 'unforeseen consequences', and solidarity with the line taken on 28 October.
Belgrade received favourably the idea of placing Soviet relations with the socialist countries on a new basis. This was raised by the Moscow government declaration of 30 October, along with the prospect of talks on withdrawing Soviet troops from Hungary.
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The Yugoslavs supported the democratization of public life, the establishment of workers' councils, and the radical reorganization of the communist party. However, they feared that attempts might be made to restore the kind of strongly right-wing, autocratic regime of Horthy's Hungary before 1945. That could give power to nationalist groups that might go on to raise the question of They were alarmed by the anticommunist atrocities and by the general vehemence of the armed uprising. They expressly rejected the unlimited introduction of a multi-party system, the establishment of a bourgeois democratic political structure, and the organization of rightwing parties, in other words, all the developments in the early days of November.
As for the Nagy government's decision to withdraw from the Warsaw Pact and declare neutrality, comment in the Yugoslav press was non-committal, although the wide public approval for the moves was made plain.
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The Nagy government's attempt at consolidation increasingly bore the character of a four-party coalition. Within a few days after 30 October, the Yugoslavs had to realize that it rested on things that their principles would not let them support. The meeting on the island of Brioni, at three in the morning on 2 November, far exceeded Khrushchev's and Malenkov's expectations.
21
The top Yugoslav leadersEdvard Kardelj and Aleksandar Rankovic were there as well as Tito -immediately conceded that military intervention was essential, to safeguard the achievements of socialism. This followed directly from the Yugoslav considerations mentioned already. However, although the two sides agreed on the decisive issue, their difference of approach led to serious tensions later. Khrushchev, during the talks, ignored the Yugoslav arguments about basing socialism on the workers' councils, reforms or de-Stalinization. Furthermore, the reaffirmation of the contents of the 18 Khrushchev, sensing this fear, later used the tactic of exaggerating the size of the Hungarian ethnic minority in Yugoslavia and citing it before the Yugoslavs as a potential threat.
Miklós Molnár, Budapest, 1956 not to confirm that relations with the socialist countries would be placed on a new footing. On the contrary, the Soviet leaders were increasingly concerned to restore the old unity in the socialist camp, after the loosening effects of the twentieth congress.
The difference of approach becomes clearest in personality terms. Yugoslavia insisted that Kádár should be made leader, rather than Ferenc Münnich, the first Soviet choice, in the hope that Hungary would then follow a line closer to Belgrade's and more independent of Moscow's. The real issue was the fate of Imre Nagy and his immediate circle. To the Soviets it was self-evident that Nagy would have to go, since he was guilty of'counter-revolution'. The Yugoslavs wanted the consolidation to bring a return to a Nagy-style policy of reform within the system, or at least the inclusion of Nagy's immediate associates in the leadership.
So the difference of approach failed to emerge at Brioni. This was not the only circumstance that was to have grave consequences. The two sides also put different constructions on an agreement between them. Based on a discussion that Ambassador Soldatic had held at the Hungarian prime minister's office on 1 November, 22 the Yugoslavs suggested giving temporary asylum to Nagy and his associates at the Yugoslav embassy. They offered to invite Nagy and a few colleagues to the embassy, and there bring them to resign and support the new government led by Kádár. Khrushchev and his party saw the proposal as a smooth and satisfactory way of sidelining Nagy, and took the reference to bringing the prime minister to resign at face value. The Yugoslavs, on the other hand, were seeking ways to salvage the situation by forging a Kádár-Nagy alliance and ensuring a continued pro-Yugoslav policy of reform. They obviously hoped the Nagy group would realize that intervention was inescapable, but that there was still a chance for partial, 'Polish-type' independence.
III. A double trap
While Khrushchev and Malenkov were negotiating in Yugoslavia, János Kádár, minister of state in the Nagy government, and Ferenc Münnich, the interior minister, were summoned by the Soviet ambassador in Budapest, Yuri Andropov.
They were taken covertly to Moscow with the cooperation of the Soviet army. On 2 November 1956, the presidium of the CPSU gave a hearing to Kádár. Shortly before his arrival, Kádár had still voted at the meeting of the Hungarian government for declaring Hungary's neutrality and withdrawing from the Warsaw Pact. He had then announced in a radio address the dissolution of the old communist party and foundation of a new party, on a platform of parliamentary democracy based on free elections, independence, and acceptance of human rights. Two days later, Kádár came forward as head of the new Kremlin-appointed Hungarian government.
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During the Ambassador's conversation with Nagy's colleagues. Géza Losonczy and Zoltán Szántó, Szántó proposed that if need be, the Yugoslavs should give asylum to the families of some politicians.
Soviet documents published recently provide the clearest picture so far of what happened in the few days leading up to Kádár's volte-face, which was tantamount to treachery.
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Initially Kádár emphasized the drawbacks of military intervention. In spite of the tough political battles it was likely to cause, he continued to argue in favour of the course the Nagy government had chosen. He carried on doing so until it was made clear to him that the intervention had already been decided and the only questions still to clarify concerned the process of implementing it. Once the situation was plain, Kádár immediately accepted the role assigned him, although he could hardly have doubted that this would brand him as a national traitor. He did not do so unconditionally, but the conditions, aimed at securing a minimum of independence, were vague and without real foundation, let alone any guarantee that they would be observed, apart from Khrushchev's promises. Apart from the undertaking to neutralize the Rákosi group, who had fled to Moscow, there was an important promise that Nagy would not cause problems of legitimacy too great to overcome. The basis on which the Soviets made this promise was the solution they had devised jointly with the Yugoslavs. By agreeing to the intervention, Kádár had adapted himself to the realistic power relations. However, by committing an act that was morally reprehensible, he had set out on a course that would lead to the execution of Imre Nagy and his associates.
The Soviet military intervention to crush the Hungarian revolution began at dawn on 4 November. However, the agreement reached at Brioni could not be implemented, which at once caused serious tension between Belgrade and Moscow.
Nagy gave news of the Soviet attack in a dramatic speech on the radio, stating that the Hungarian forces were doing battle and the government was in place. Then he took up the invitation of the Yugoslav diplomats, and went with several colleagues to the Yugoslav embassy, where he received asylum.
Nagy's radio speech alone was enough to infuriate the Soviet leaders, who had always inclined towards treating him as a traitor. The situation was worsened when the plan to make the Prime Minister resign came unstuck, despite the promises made by Yugoslav diplomats and politicians. The Nagy group were not the only ones caught in a trap. The Yugoslavs found themselves in an irrevocably paradoxical situation in which several factors were at work. While the Belgrade leaders were assuring the Kádár government of their support, they were also directly responsible for what happened to the Nagy group, which dissociated itself utterly from Kádár.
Meanwhile they tried to keep on good terms with Khrushchev, who was becoming increasingly incensed. They also had to look to their international reputation, which was already strained by their acceptance of Soviet intervention. Nor was the way in which the situation was taken at home irrelevant. The domestic political difficulties were exemplified by the renewed arrest of the enfant terrible of Yugoslav politics, Milovan Djilas, for what he had written about the Hungarian revolution. Tito's biggest problem was the rapid freeze in Soviet-Yugoslav relations, whose consequences soon appeared in differing interpretations of the former Hungarian uprising. Khrushchev, in a letter of 7 November, was already expressing dismay that the Yugoslavs had failed to keep their promise to neutralize the former Hungarian prime minister. Nagy was being seen increasingly not just as a factor to be overcome, but as the main culprit for the Hungarian 'counter-revolution'. So Moscow found it unacceptable that the Nagy group should be taken to Yugoslavia, as Tito proposed. Instead the Soviets demanded that they be handed over to the new Kádár government. Otherwise, Khrushchev openly threatened the Yugoslavs, Nagy would be presented as a Yugoslav spy, and Belgrade given some of the blame for the events in Hungary.
24 A strong caution went out when the columns of Pravda were opened to the Albanian leader, Enver Hoxha, Yugoslavia's bitterest enemy, to air his familiar accusations, which found a ready response among Stalinist leaders of other communist parties. The Soviets were disgusted, because Tito had chosen to defend his own reputation and to try to dissociate himself from the military intervention, and because the problem of Stalinism was an especially sensitive one for Khrushchev.
This was a most inappropriate time for a debate on the Soviet and Yugoslav models.
To retain a safe political base in the Kremlin, he had to prove above all his ability to keep order on the edges of the empire and apply the steadfast principles of Soviet regional policy. Tito's support was opportune for Kádár, but the heightening 24 Khrushchev's letter to Tito, 7 Nov. 1956 The Pula speech gravely affected the Nagy group, trapped in the Yugoslav embassy. For Tito had spoken of 'flight', which pointed to a breakdown of solidarity. Although the Yugoslavs were careful to retain an appearance of sympathy, the Nagy group were increasingly becoming a burden to them. Concern to defend Yugoslavia's reputation and escape from the predicament became almost the sole criteria during the negotiations about the group's future.
After long and hard negotiations, the Yugoslavs managed to obtain Kádár's signature to a letter guaranteeing impunity and freedom to return home for the Nagy group, in exchange for their loss of asylum. But the Yugoslavs must have known that this was just a safeguard against charges likely to be levelled against them, rather than a way of rescuing Nagy and his associates. The Yugoslavs did not hesitate to make this sacrifice in order to escape from the trap in which they were caught. Nonetheless, they had managed, with the letter of guarantee, to place a time-bomb under the Hungarians, which Kádár had to try to defuse every time the question of prosecuting the Nagy group was raised.
However, the existence of the guarantee letter, as evidence of a breach of faith, was not the only factor that cooled the ardour of the Hungarian leadership's conduct against Yugoslavia. Kádár sought to appear as a politician of the centre.
Irrespective of the letter, his power interests dictated that he should minimize the level of conflict, while carrying out mercilessly consistent reprisals to which the Yugoslavs objected, above all the sentence on Imre Nagy. To this end he did not hesitate to break his word on later occasions either.
IV. The ideological battle and the Nagy affair
The main concern of the Yugoslav leaders, in their diplomatic actions and protest notes after the Nagy group had been kidnapped and taken to Romania, was to restore their international reputation. The debate caused sharp tensions in the Hungarian party leadership. The editor-in-chief of the central party newspaper was dismissed after a strike at the offices sparked by withdrawal of an article intervening in the Soviet-Yugoslav debate. The 'Titoism' apparent in the Hungarian leadership was mentioned in the report addressed by G. M. Malenkov, M. A. Suslov and A. B. Aristov to the CPSU central committee on 24 Nov. 1956. Szereda and Sztikalin, Hiányzó lapok 1956, 175-7. 28 Yugoslavia protested in notes to the Hungarian government on 23 Nov. 1956 and to the Soviet government on 24 Nov. against the blatant infringement of the agreement. For the exchanges, see Documents I (items 123, 124, 129, 130 and 134) and Documents II (item 6). 29 Gomulka disagreed with the use of force and avoided the expression 'counter-revolution' until excellent chance to set out their position. Indeed they tried to use the events as a form of self-justification. They were remarkably active in associating the aspirations apparent in the Hungarian revolution with propaganda for the Yugoslav model. Budapest, on the other hand, suffered mounting discomfiture as the need to retain Yugoslav support began to clash with the change in the approach to consolidation. By early December, the administration's measures to prop up its authority were becoming increasingly violent and vindictive, and aimed above all at restoration. The central committee of the HSWP (Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party -the renamed HWP) passed a resolution early in December so defining 'the causes of the counter-revolution' that it was easy to deduce from them the idea of an international imperialist plot assisted by domestic betrayal. Whether Yugoslavia would be classed as a culprit depended simply on how relations between Belgrade and the Kremlin developed.
The Yugoslavs reacted to the situation with an ideological offensive. The assessment of Hungarian events acquired a new dimension in the ensuing debate.
On 7 December, Edvard Kardelj made a speech in Skupstina, Yugoslavia, that long remained a stumbling block for the leaders of the socialist countries.
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He raised again the question of the system, by stating that the working class in Hungary had risen up 'against its own historical interests'. Clearly the Yugoslavs did not want to diagnose either a 'deliberately organized counter-revolution' or a 'struggle fought for freedom and independence'. So they tried, in describing the uprising, to stress the consolidation aspect, concentrating on the prospects for the workers' councils.
Kardelj argued that the truly communist approach was not to restore the bureaucratic system or reconstruct the political system centred on the party. It was to develop the kind of system, based on workers' self-management, that the workers' councils were demanding from an instinctively socialist position. Here he disregarded the workers' councils' insistence on a multi-party system and other 'vestiges of bouregois liberalism' that the Yugoslav communists likewise rejected.
What was essential was to present the Yugoslav model as an alternative to restoring Stalinism. Hungary, however, had no choice in the matter. The attempt to apply pressure was fruitless. The argument became increasingly concerned with vindication, as the debate became steadily more acrimonious.
The Yugoslav challenge was extremely unpleasant for the Kádár government. It cast aspersions on the legitimacy of a forcible consolidation of power, in the area of greatest topical concern: the struggle against the workers' councils. The Soviet intervention was followed in Budapest and across the country by a general political strike led by the workers' councils. The Kádár government responded by banning the local workers' councils and arresting their leaders.
it added to the pressure on Hungary to distance itself from the more popular Yugoslav model and fall into line with the Soviet leadership, which further reduced its chances of gaining legitimacy. The contradiction was contained in the Yugoslav action itself. The Yugoslavs could not do otherwise than oppose a trend unfavourable to them, but in doing so they weakened Kádár's position against the Soviets, even though they saw in him the chance of a leadership that would be Muscovite in a less orthodox way. The Yugoslavs had nothing to gain from a return by the Rákosi leadership. From the safety of Moscow, the Rákosi group were intriguing to return home and presume power. They had sensed that the crisis was deepening and emphasized the 'Titoist' nature of the Kádár leadership. Attempts were made in Budapest to try to stop the relations from worsening, but the Hungarians had to yield to the stronger tendency as well. The balance was affected most of all by two connected factors. One was the process of criminalizing the Imre Nagy case. This was not simply apparent in the way the charges against the Nagy group coincided with the criticisms of the Yugoslavs. Apart from that, the first steps were taken to investigate the relations between the two. The other decisive factor was the Soviet-Hungarian summit meeting of March 1957, which finalized the decisions that were being weighed. On the one hand, Rákosi was declared once and for all to be politically 'dead'. On the other, it was agreed to take criminal proceedings against Imre Nagy. This coincided with a further hardening of policy towards Yugoslavia. As a sign of this, the Hungarians and the Soviet Union, at the topmost level and in public, made statements condemning the 'counter-revolutionary' Nagy group and the Yugoslav leaders who had 'nourished and encouraged' them.
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This aroused strong displeasure in Belgrade, especially when the Nagy group were arrested in Romania and brought back to Budapest. Anxiety was immediately expressed that the trial of Imre Nagy, designed to compromise a recalcitrant Yugoslavia, was being prepared as a repetition of the Rajk trial of 1949. 36 This assumption was all the more justified because the Hungarian party leaders, on their return from Moscow, made the instructions they had received from the CPSU clear when reporting on the results of the negotiations. Khrushchev's letter to Tito on 10 Jan. 1957, quoted earlier, still contained a denial that a campaign would be initiated against Yugoslavia like that in 1948. Kádár's reports to the leadership of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (HSWP) in the early days of April gave evidence of the change in the situation. This appeared in the reference to the validity of the 1948 Cominform resolution, in the The parallel with the Rajk trial was also a warning by the Yugoslavs. They had other weapons to hand besides the November letter of guarantee, if anyone tried to use the Nagy trial against them. This was one obvious reason why Kádár did not want to aggravate matters. He hastened to assure the ambassador, Jovo Kapicic that they wanted to settle relations on a friendly footing. If there were a trial, they would not use it to compromise Yugoslavia. 38 From then onwards, Budapest's handling of Hungarian-Yugoslav relations was curiously ambiguous. Kádár wanted to moderate the conflict with the Yugoslavs, but not to make any concessions on the Nagy case, which was generating the conflict. To resolve the conundrum, he tried, even by deception, to minimize the Yugoslav involvement in the Nagy affair, which was causing them great concern. Kádár had the political committee of the HSWP drop from its agenda the sending of a provocative letter that explored the Yugoslav responsibility for the Hungarian events and called upon the Yugoslavs to condemn the counter-revolution and distance themselves from Nagy. This was a matter on which Kádár and Foreign Minister Imre Horváth had to express themselves explicidy, though they did so in a restrained way, in an attempt to mend relations.
Foreign Minister Koca Popovic's report in the Federal House of Representatives, 26 Feb. 1957 , Borba, 27 Feb. 1957 The Soviet leadership's reply: Pravda, 11 Mar. 1957. 43 Tito signified on several occasions his desire to normalize relations. He stated this in the paper Mladost on 22 May 1957 and in Politika on 24 May. See Tito, Borba za mir, 284-310. Normalization of inter-state relations was apparent in the conclusion of several agreements. A sign of rapprochement on improvement could be seen before the attempt to oust Khrushchev, although it was obviously connected with the political strife and power struggle taking place in the Soviet leadership. It was clearly not a coincidence that Khrushchev told ambassador Micunovic he was planning major changes in CPSU policy. Micunovic (1990) , Tito követe voltam, Minutes of the June 1957 plenary meeting of the CPSU central committee, Istorichesky Arkhiv, No. 4-6, 1993. 46 Micunovic, Tito követe voltam, For detail of the joint communiqué, see Clissold (1975) on the results of the investigation and the grave sentences decided in advance, said the prosecution had no desire to make use of facts that would compromise the Yugoslav government. He also described plans for warding off or blunting the sharp attacks to be expected, but on the whole it seemed better to postpone the trial.
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During the talks in Romania, the Yugoslavs made it plain that they were against bringing Imre Nagy and his associates to trial, and if this happened nonetheless, it was bound to strain Yugoslav-Hungarian relations. The big conference of communist parties planned for November could not be encumbered with a conflict like the one the Nagy trial would engender. There were also fears that a gross move of this kind would have adverse effects on the course of the Yugoslav party congress, which was originally planned for the autumn of 1957. Furthermore, the United Nations was preparing to debate the Hungarian question at its General Assembly in September.
Irrespective of the postponement of the Nagy trial, the improvement in Yugoslav-Soviet relations soon ceased. When the preparations for the conference of international communist parties revealed what documents the conference was supposed to adopt, there was clearly no trace of the desired international shift towards de-Stalinization. On the contrary, the draft document showed marked Chinese influence, and foreshadowed a renewal of the campaign against revisionism and a revival of the ill-framed Cominform in some form. There was nothing the leaders of the League of Yugoslav Communists (LYC) wanted less than to admit anyone's right to lay down for them a common ideology or political Une.
Yugoslavia's whole foreign-policy doctrine would be questioned by such an admission, which would amount to 'applying' tojóin the Soviet camp.
As the strains built up again, the curious feature of the Hungarian-Yugoslav relationship was the effort both sides put into lessening the tension and preventing its spreading. Although Kádár continued to comply strictly with the Soviet position, 48 Micunovic, Tito követe voltam, Notes by Y. V. Andropov, R. A. Rudenko and P. I. Ivashutin on their meeting with Interior Minister Béla Biszku, 26 Aug. 1957, in Gál et al., Jelcin dosszié, 199-203. he set about seeking a compromise solution on the conference document. The Yugoslav delegate did not vote for the critical report by the so-called Committee of Five. He argued that it was not objective enough and did nothing to encourage an atmosphere in which Hungary could resolve its problems. Statement by Delegate Joze Brilej, Borba, 4 Sep. 1957. 32 Hungarian memorandum on the talks, Documents II, item 84.
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The Yugoslavs signed only the peace manifesto accepted by the delegates of all the 68 parties present in Moscow. A decisive factor behind Khrushchev's choice was the priority given to consolidating unity in the socialist camp. That could be done with a rigid declaration reminiscent of the Stalin period, which the party leaders would gladly support because it helped to keep them in power. Mao, in exchange for the proclaimed hard-line policy, recognized the Soviet Union's leading role and himself pressed for it to be underlined. So Khrushchev could hardly have chosen a different course, because otherwise he would have brought on himself the odium of precipitating the conflicts. That was too high a price to pay for gestures to a 'suspect' country that wished anyway to stay outside the fold. Reversing the rapprochement with Yugoslavia was one, albeit major, element in a game that had just begun, for the basic Sino-Soviet difference of foreign policy remained. Mao was taking aggressive, confrontational steps designed to provoke utilization of the temporary military superiority gained in the missile arms race. Khrushchev wanted to exploit this superiority in a different way, but due to other power factors, he was willing to make ideological concessions -even to revive the revisionism debate. This, under Chinese pressure, soon took an exceptionally crude form, with the Hungarian question playing a prominent part.
Considering the roles in which the various players were cast, there is a greater need to explain why the Moscow conference was followed by a short period of Kádár would certainly have preferred the former version, but he could not be sure of its chances. So in the ambivalent situation, neither a declaration of inherent 'good intentions' nor any indication of a threat was included.
Attention had to be paid, during the political preparations for the Nagy trial, to the written guarantee of impunity that Kádár had given the Yugoslavs in November 1956. The time had come to find a way to make it ineffective. The attempt to do so and the failure of that attempt tie in closely with the protraction of the Nagy trial, or rather with the Soviet-Yugoslav dispute that broke out and deepened in the meantime.
It still seemed at the end of December as if nothing would prevent the trial from going ahead, as the Soviet leadership had also agreed to it. 56 In the event it had to be interrupted early in 1958, at the Soviet Union's request, for reasons of Soviet foreign policy. Moscow, in late 1957 and early 1958, launched a large-scale peace offensive, including strong elements of propaganda. With initiatives to halt the arms race and hold Soviet-US summit meetings in the air, it seemed anything but opportune for Hungary to conduct a trial that was sure to poison the international political atmosphere. The idea of blunting the negative reactions with a light sentence had never been seriously entertained, so that the only option was to suspend the trial just after it had begun in secret. 57 The decision to suspend the trial later had serious consequences for relations with Yugoslavia. Although it aroused ideas about how to avert, or at least ease, the conflict that the trial was expected to provoke, developments in the spring of 1958 led to a reversal of this favourable shift in events.
Essentially, the Hungarian tactic was to tie the annulment of the letter guaranteeing impunity to the Nagy group to an improvement in HungarianYugoslav relations. This would underline the seriousness of the offer to avoid raising during the trial the question of Yugoslavia's role and responsibility. As a first step, its likely outcome, they learned even from the few documents shown to them that it was being held. This announcement, as Kádár had expected, did not upset relations, which seemed to be mending, because the prime consideration for Tito and his colleagues was Hungary's promise not to turn the trial against Yugoslavia.
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The atmosphere at the talks gave grounds for confidence, and the Hungarian leaders made rapid attempts to deepen trust. However, for reasons beyond their control, events took another turn that dealt Kádár's credibility a further serious blow.
The Soviet Union had meanwhile decided to launch another political and ideological offensive against the Yugoslavs.
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It was already a bad sign when Khrushchev resumed criticism of Tito's Pula speech, reviving the charge that it was simply an attempt to divert some of the socialist countries 'on to the well-known Yugoslav road'. The Soviet leaders saw the Yugoslav conduct at the Moscow meeting, and still more the draft programme due to be put to the seventh congress of the LYC, as a provocation to which the socialist camp had to make a decisive response. The draft did not contain really new policies, but to incorporate the 'Yugoslav road' into a system and present it as a programme was a challenge to firm 38 Documents II, item 96. 39 This appears, for instance, from the Yugoslav note of 8 Oct. 1958, one of the important documents in the Yugoslav-Hungarian exchange of notes after the Nagy trial. Documents II, item 150. Western rejection of the Rapacki Plan, named after the Polish foreign minister, left diminishing hope that the proffered summit meeting would be held.
Information from the Soviet leadership to János Kádár, Documents II, item 111.
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Wilson, Tito's Yugoslavia, 122. The British Embassy's report of 10 May 1958 also concluded that the Soviet charge was essentially one of Yugoslav duplicity, FO 371/596/N1011/27. A. Rankovic refuted this in a strongly worded speech at the Yugoslav party congress.
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Renmin Ribao, 5 May 1958. ground for the Nagy trial, within a conspiracy theory. Conversely, the concept behind the trial provided vantage-points from which to launch attacks on Yugoslavia.
There seemed to be no way to stop the escalating deterioration of relations, which spread to economic affairs, causing Yugoslavia some serious problems. 65 Belgrade soon concluded that there was a revival of the earlier policies and methods of Cominform. The Yugoslavs' most effective rejoinder was to confront the CPSU leaders in the press with their earlier statements on the de-Stalinization process. The aim was to return the debate to the original problem posed at the end of 1956, by the differences in assessing the Hungarian uprising. What model of socialism was to be followed after the twentieth congress? The Soviet leaders solved the matter in the short term by pronouncing the Yugoslav views anti-Marxist and analysing the conflict through the logic of the bipolar world system. Apart from references to the similarity between Yugoslav revisionism and Nagy's views, there were accusations that Yugoslav pride at being outside both camps was furthering a break with the socialist camp and preparing for a bourgeois restoration.
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Up to the last minute, Tito tried to stop Yugoslavia being blamed for the events in Hungary of 1956. One day before the trial ended, he sent a long letter to the CPSU leaders. In it he appended to his arguments the hope that the promises about reminiscent of 1948 continued, the Yugoslavs would have no choice but to take up the struggle being forced upon them.
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In the event, the promises Tito referred to were dispelled by the acrimonious international conflict. The Kádár regime had to choose the worse option from their own point of view as well, so that the Yugoslav aspect received strong emphasis in the Nagy trial. The materials prepared during the investigation to compromise Yugoslavia were brought forward for propaganda purposes during and after the Nagy trial, which aroused enormous international dissension. Symbolically therefore, the trial also placed the Yugoslav leaders in the dock.
VII. The Nagy trial and the war of the protest notes
The Hungarian government issued an official statement on 17 June 1958 about the Imre Nagy trial, announcing the execution or imprisonment of the former prime minister and his associates. The communique castigated the Yugoslav leaders. They were charged with active support, during 'the counter-revolutionary uprising' and subsequent 'organization of resistance', for the Nagy group, which had 'followed the pirate flag of national communism', as accomplices in the conspiracy by international imperialism and domestic reaction. and to include a threat of further incriminating information.
72
On the other hand, Khrushchev resisted the temptation to follow the policy urged by the Chinese, which cast doubt on Yugoslavia's socialist nature and aimed at breaking off relations.
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He was content to show his ability to take firm measures, including the application of economic pressure, and to demonstrate to countries in the socialist camp what narrow constraints he placed on their independent political and ideological endeavours. He did not want to become a prisoner of the hardline policy promoted by Mao.
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Order had been restored in the region. After the Nagy trial, not only Kádár, but Gomulka of Poland, who had shown solidarity with Kádár, became a firm Soviet ally as well.
However, this was unclear directly after the Nagy trial, at the symbolic climax of the hostility, least of all to the Hungarian leaders. The problems with formulating the Hungarian stance in the diplomatic conflict that followed the trial were not confined to gauging the right degree of action against Yugoslavia. The Hungarians had to satisfy two conflicting demands at once. On the one hand they had to contribute to the campaign against Belgrade, integral to which was the question of Yugoslav responsibility in the Nagy affair. On the other hand they had to deny that placing Yugoslavia in the dock was among the aims of this campaign, because that would have justified the parallel the Yugoslavs were drawing with the Rajk trial.
Eventually the protracted process of drafting the note led to more sober, moderate policies prevailing over solutions that ran the risk of exacerbating the confrontation.
That did not immediately end the differences, of course, but at least it did leave open the prospect of preventing a further deterioration in relations, which was not in the interest of the Yugoslavs either. The conflict came to a relatively rapid end largely because the Soviet and the Yugoslav leadership saw that there was nothing more to gain from deepening the dispute. The Soviet leaders had still contributed directly to deciding the measures the Hungarians took during the summer of 1958, but after that they withdrew from 72 Gál et al., Jelcin dosszié, János Kádár's report to the HSWP political committee, 1 Jul. 1958, Documents II, item 136. 74 The policy of the 'great leap forward' was announced at the second session of the eighth congress of the Chinese Communist Party, in May 1958. Its consequences became increasingly apparent. Khrushchev's speech at his meeting with the Polish leaders, Pravda, 11 Nov. 1958.
